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Abstract. With the ongoing evolution from closed to open distributed
systems and the lifting of the assumption that agents acting in such a
system do not pursue own goals and act in the best interest of the society,
new problems arise. One of them is that compliance cannot be assumed
necessarily and consequently trust issues arise. One way of tackling this
problem is by regulating the behavior of the agents with the help of insti-
tutions. However for institutions to function effectively their compliance
needs to be ensured. Using a utility computing scenario as sample appli-
cation, this paper presents a general applicable taxonomy for ensuring
compliance that can be consulted for analyzing, comparing and develop-
ing enforcement strategies and hopefully will stimulate research in this
area.
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1 Self-Interested Agents in Utility Computing
1.1 The Vision of Utility Computing
The vision of Utility Computing (UtiC) has gained significant interest in the
last years and has become a popular buzzword. The word “utility” is used to
make an analogy to the provision of other services, such as electrical power, the
telephone, gas or water, in which the service providers seek to meet fluctuating
customer needs, and charge for the fungible resources they sell based on usage
rather than on a flat-rate basis1. In the computing context examples of such
resources are storage space, server capacity, bandwidth or computer processing
time. UtiC envisions that in contrast to traditional models of web hosting where
1 It is important to note that although the services offered by the service providers are
individualized, their basic components are very standardized resources that can be
easily exchanged. Thus, a telephone provider for example may provide his customers
with very different telephone packages, however the underlying resources he uses are
standardized telephone units.
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the web site owner purchases or leases a single server or space on a shared
server and is charged a fixed fee, the fixed costs are substituted by variable costs
and he is charged upon how many of the fungible resources he actually uses
on demand over a given period of time in order to perform his computationally
intensive calculations. The business idea behind this vision is that if a company
has to pay only for what it is using it can adapt its cost structure and will be
able to economize, i.e. save money, while the company offering utility computing
resources can benefit from economies of scale by using the same infrastructure
to serve multiple clients [8].
Looking at the nature of the resources sold in the UtiC context as well as the
potential number of transactions that might be conducted in such an infrastruc-
ture, it seems reasonable to argue that UtiC is an ideal field of application for
automated negotiations using artificial agents [16]. Thus, the resources traded
in UtiC have a high degree of standardization, and furthermore the open inter-
action system as well as the high number of repetitive transaction, suggest the
usage of artificial agents that act on behalf of their human owners. Furthermore,
as mentioned in the AgentLink Roadmap [25], Multi-Agent-Systems (MAS) offer
strong models for representing complex and dynamic environment that cannot
be analyzed mathematically any more, but need to be simulated. However when
thinking in the lines of this vision, several problems occur, such as the question
about the risks involved in UtiC transactions. Thus, it has to be ascertained that
the bilateral economic exchange envisioned in UtiC is very likely to involve risks,
such as risks resulting from strategic- and parametric uncertainties, that shall
be explained in the next section with regard to the problem of self-interested
agents [38].
For the further analysis it has to be noted that this paper views UtiC as one
possible field of application of electronic institutions or e-commerce. Nevertheless
as it is a good example of an open distributed market that can be simulated with
MAS simulation, it is explained in more detail at this point and will be used as
example in the course of the paper.
1.2 Strategic Uncertainties resulting from Self-Interested Agents
As noted at the end of the last section, two main kinds of uncertainties exist
in UtiC transactions, namely strategic- and parametric uncertainties. Whereas
the latter ones refer to environmental uncertainties that cannot (or only with
a disproportionate effort) be reduced by the UtiC participants, the strategic
uncertainties concern the question of whether the transaction partners are willing
to comply with what has been agreed on or not; and whether, if a transaction
has had an adverse outcome, this was due to bad luck or bad intentions [26, 21].
Thus, if a buyer does not receive the promised UtiC resources from the seller, it
is often hard to judge whether the seller did not deliver intentionally, or whether
the transaction failed, because the network broke down for example.
The basic assumption behind this the problem of strategic uncertainty thereby
is that agents are rational believe forming utility maximizing entities. Thereby
it is assumed that the agents do not necessarily always act in the best interest
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of the societies global (or social) welfare. Instead they are likely to pursue their
individual goals and try to maximize their profit (in terms of a maximization
of their utility function) [31]. That is why agents may choose to not fulfill a
contract as promised, if they expect a higher own utility from this. Thereby
the decisions about the utility of different options by each agent are based on
the limited information the particular agent has about the environment (i.e. the
agents have a bounded rationality). As a result it becomes difficult to assess
and control the utility functions of all participating agents. As a consequence it
is very challenging from a UtiC environment designers point of view to control
that the overall UtiC market outcome is as desired.
As a result institutions are needed that influence the utility functions of the
agents and create incentives in such a way that cooperation is the dominant
strategy and strategic uncertainty can be reduced to a minimum extent. In the
next section the term institutions as used in this paper will be explained and
the roles of institutions for regulating and controlling UtiC will be analyzed in
more detail (2). Thereby special focus will be on the ensuring of the compliance
with the institutions in UtiC as “if not being enforced effectively, [institutions]
are nothing more than a decorative accessory” [9]. In the course of the analysis
of the compliance-ensuring of institutions for UtiC, as the main contribution
of this paper, in section 3 a taxonomy will be developed that tries to combine
all elementary compliance-ensuring options in one table and to classify them in
a expedient way. In a second step, the different elements of the taxonomy will
be explained in detail in the sections 3.1–3.5 with the help of UtiC examples.
Although, the main focus of this paper is UtiC, UtiC itself is just seen as a
sample application for open distributed systems by the author. Thus, the au-
thor aims at presenting a general applicable taxonomy that can be consulted for
analyzing, comparing and developing compliance-ensuring strategies and hope-
fully will stimulate research in this area. In a last step in this paper a research
proposal will be made how to evaluate the taxonomy elements one against the
other (chapter 4). Thereby 5 performance indicators will be presented that shall
serve as a starting point for this analysis. Furthermore a research outline will of
how the mechanisms shall be evaluated will be presented (chapter 4).
2 Ensuring Compliance of Institutions for Controlling
Utility Computing
2.1 Institutions in Utility Computing
As mentioned in the last section, resulting from the openness of UtiC envi-
ronments two problems arise: First of all anybody can participate in such an
infrastructure and act intentionally and optimally towards their own specific
goals (i.e utility functions). The second problem is that the overall social wel-
fare of the system emerges as a result of the individual decisions and actions of
the individual agents. However the utility functions that the agents base their
decisions on are dynamic and normally private information of the individuals
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and are therefore hardly predictable for the UtiC environment designers. As a
result, “appropriate” mechanisms that foster compliance and regulate the UtiC
environments (in terms of defining a regulative framework as well as sanctions
for non-compliance with the framework2) need to be applied in order to achieve
an “acceptable” overall behavior. The most promising mechanism, which will be
addressed in this paper is the usage of institutions. Institutions alter the relative
prices for defections and thereby create incentives for a system-conform behav-
ior. This paper thereby understands the term institutions as often used in new
institutional economics, namely is follows:
Institutions are formal (e.g. statute law, common law, regulations) and
informal structures (e.g. conventions, norms of behavior and self imposed
codes of conduct) and mechanisms of social order and cooperation gov-
erning the behavior of a set of individuals by attributing rights and
obligations to them. They are identified with a social purpose and per-
manence, transcending individual intentions, and with the making and
compliance-ensuring of rules governing cooperative human behavior and
thereby define the social outcomes that result from individual actions
[29, 33].
Looking at this definition three main aspects can be remarked. The first one
is that in the institutional economic view institutions are understood as a very
abstract notion of a set of norms or social structure. Hence norms are seen
to be component of institutions, which are the overall concept of a regulative
framework. The second aspect to be remarked concerns the role of institutions,
namely the setting up of a framework of rules and actions in which the agents
have to operate. This framework not only defines what agents should and should
not do, but erects sanctions to be applied if the framework is violated. And
this is where the third main aspect comes into play: the compliance-ensuring
component. As North phrased it in [28] with regard to ensuring compliance:
“...[it] poses no problem when it is in the interests of the other party
to live up to agreements. But without institutional constraints, self-
interested behavior will foreclose complex exchange, because of the un-
certainty that the other party will find it in his or her interest to live up
to the agreement.”
What North formulated in this statement is very straight forward: the com-
pliance with an institutional framework poses no problem, if no self-interested
behavior is involved. If however – as in UtiC – this is not the case and agents
can exhibit self-interested behavior, it is important that institutions do not only
state a set of rules, but it needs to be taken care that their compliance is ensured,
because otherwise the strategic uncertainties arising might negatively influence
the usage of an environment (e.g. UtiC).
2 In this paper special focus will be on regulative rules as they pose problems in terms
of compliance-ensuring. Although being of high importance as well constitutive rules
will be omitted as their non-compliance leads to nullity [20].
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After this brief description of the role of institutions and especially the ensur-
ing of their compliance in UtiC, in the next section, the related work relevant for
the implementation of institutions in open distributed environments such as UtiC
shall be reviewed. Thereby special focus will be once again on the compliance-
ensuring aspect as it is has a key function in the success of every institutional
setting.
2.2 Related Work
Already in 1998, Conte et al. [10] pointed out two distinct sets of problems rel-
evant for MAS research on norms: (1) the interaction of different autonomous
agents on a norm-governed basis and (2) the interaction of individual autonomous
agents with the norms (including the acquisition and the violation of norms).
This problem definition has been expanded by Boella and van der Torre [4] to
include a third question that deals with the evolution of norms. The first of the
three questions has been discussed at length by researchers using game-theoretic
approaches [4]; however a model integrating these approaches with the different
social, cognitive and normative concepts is still missing. The second question has
been studied by Broersen et al. [7] for example, who focused on the agent archi-
tecture for determining how agents can acquire and violate norms and how norms
in turn influence agent behavior. Last but not least, the third question has been
dealt with by Verhagen [37] and some economic commerce researchers. Verhagen
distinguished between norms created by legislators, norms negotiated between
agents and norms emerging spontaneously and thereby laid the groundwork for
a number of papers about protocols and social mechanisms for the creation [5]
and agent mediated evolution of norms [34] in MAS. In spite of this intensive
research on the creation of norms in MAS, little work has been done explic-
itly addressing the ensuring of the compliance with such norms. Thus, although
trust and reputation mechanisms as centralized (e.g. eBay) and decentralized
coordination and compliance-ensuring instances [32] have been discussed by a
number of researchers, the mechanisms tend to concentrate on specific use cases
and often fail to address the importance of these mechanisms in the compliance
context. Thus, in many papers it is explicitly assumed, that all normative regula-
tions can be asserted and therefore little or no thought is given on what happens
if this assumption cannot be fulfilled, although many scientists have stated that
institutions and norms are more or less senseless if their compliance cannot be
ensured [9].
One of the few papers that deals with compliance and analyzes at what lev-
els it can be applied in a system was written by Va´zquez-Salceda et al. [36],
who not only make a distinction between regimentation and enforcement, but
also elaborate on the levels of observability of norm violations. Other authors
that address the compliance topic in their papers include D. Grossi [19, 20] who
also distinguished between enforcement and regimentation, L. van der Torre, G.
Boella and H. Verhagen (see [4] or [5] for example) as well as A. Perreau de
Pinninck, C. Sierra and M. Schorlemmer [30], A. Artikis, M. Sergot and J. Pitt
[1], M. Esteva, J. Padget and C. Sierra [15] or A. Garcia-Camino, P. Noriega
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and J. A. Rodriguez-Aguilar [17]. All these papers elaborate on the importance
of suitable mechanisms for ensuring compliance in distributed systems and pro-
pose mechanisms for specific scenarios. However in these papers, little analysis
can be found, examining and comparing the different compliance ideas based on
a common setting and researching on the interplay of the different concepts as
well as their applicability for certain settings. That is why, this paper aims at
providing a first step into the research just mentioned by presenting a compre-
hensive taxonomy for ensuring compliance with institutions, that can be used
not only as a basis for analyzing different compliance mechanisms, but also for
comparing, combining and in general developing corresponding strategies.
3 A Taxonomy for Ensuring Institutional Compliance in
Utility Computing
After having had a brief look at the existing literature about institutions and the
ensuring of their compliance in the last section, in this section a taxonomy of all
methods through which compliance can be administered shall be developed. The
goal of this endeavor is to illuminate the general concept of ensuring compliance
as well as its different potential forms of implementation.Thereby, first of all, the
cornerstones of the taxonomy (the column heads in figure 1) will be explained.
This will be followed by a detailed analysis of the resulting compliance-ensuring
mechanisms. The ideas for the taxonomy are based on works by Ellickson [13]
(that were already cited by North [28] as theoretical “enforcement” foundation)
and works by Grossi [19, 20] who made a distinction between regimentation and
enforcement and proposed a basic classification mechanism for enforcement con-
cepts.
To start, as already defined in section 2.1, an institutionally tailored system
consists of a framework of rules defining normatively appropriate behavior. The
compliance with these rules is ensured through (positive or negative) sanctions,
the administration of which is itself governed by rules. Concerning the sanctions,
institutionally entailored systems typically employ both rewards and punishment
– both carrots and sticks – to influence behavior. In order to administer these
positive and negative sanctions, agent behavior is usually divided into three
categories [13]:
1. good behavior that is to be rewarded,
2. ordinary behavior that warrants no response (as giving a response to the
most common behavior only tends to increase the costs of administering
sanctions) and therefore will not be discussed any further in this paper, and
3. negative behavior that is to be punished.
However, before any compliance-ensuring can take place another aspect has
to be thought about: the behavior of the agents needs to be monitored in or-
der to categorize it and apply the right kind of sanction3. This monitoring can
3 In the further course of this paper, the main focus will be on sanctions that punish
negative behavior, as these are especially relevant in the context of strategic uncer-
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Fig. 1. Taxonomy for Ensuring Institutional Compliance
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be done by observers in a system. Thereby it seems useful to distinguish be-
tween 4 types of observers, that not only monitor the behavior of the individual
agents, but can act as information source for both rules of behavior and sanc-
tions: a first-party observer who controls his accordance with the rules in a sys-
tem (whether self-imposed or imposed by other sources) himself, a second-party
observer who observes the behavior of his transaction partner(s), third-party
observers that control the behavior of other agents the system and last but not
least the infrastructure (in the sense of both, the infrastructure as a whole as
well as infrastructural entities) as observer. Once, the behavior of the agents is
observed, the ensuring of compliance can take place. This can either be done by
te observer of the violation or by another party. In total this paper distinguishes
4 different kinds of compliance-ensuring entities which all have different kinds of
sanctions that can be used for ensuring institutional compliance. The 4 enforcers
are: the infrastructure provided by the UtiC designer (including institutional en-
tities as a sub-group), social groups (up to the society as whole) consisting of
non-infrastructural entities, second-party enforcers (i.e. the transaction partners)
and first party-enforcers.
As a result of these considerations, the taxonomy that can be seen in the
final column of figure 1 can be developed. The taxonomy is the synthesis of
the 4 types of observers that can spot the behavior of agents with regard to the
institutional framework (e.g. violations or actions in accordance with the institu-
tions) and the 4 types of compliance ensurers that (depending on their type) can
apply sanctions (in order to ensure compliance). It consists of 8 different kinds
of combined systems that represent all compliance-ensuring concepts that can
be applied reasonably: infrastructural control (white box), infrastructural control
(black box), institutionalization of other agents, infrastructural assisted enforce-
ment (third-party), promisee-enforced rules, infrastructural assisted enforcement
(second-party) and self-control.
3.1 Regimentation vs. Enforcement
After briefly explaining the main categories (i.e. the column heads in figure 1), as
a last step before going into detail about the synthesized taxonomy, the distinc-
tion between the two row heads of figure 1, i.e. regimentation and enforcement
shall be explained.
Regimentation refers to the ensuring of institutional compliance by making
violation states unreachable via an appropriate infrastructure (i.e. allowing for
no deviation from institutionally defined behavior) so that no compliance issues
occur [23]. This is normally done in either of the following two ways.
1. By ensuring that all agents’ mental states are accessible to the system (closed
systems), and can be altered to be in accordance with the normative frame-
work. Thus, agents are treated as a white box that’s content can be by
tainties. However all the taxonomy elements of this paper can be thought of in form
of reward mechanisms for good behavior as well.
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analyzed and altered (this concept is for example applied in the KAoS archi-
tecture [6]). In the taxonomy this idea is referred to as infrastructural control
(white box).
2. In case the mental states are not accessible to the system (i.e. the inner
states of an agent are a black box to the system), compliance is ensured by
constraining the actions of the individual agents. This idea is for example
used in systems such as ISLANDER that uses so-called “governors”. In IS-
LANDER agents do not act directly but through their governor, who can
consequently check all actions. Hence, if an agent wants to send a message
that is not allowed, the governor will not send it and consequently institu-
tional compliance is ensured [14]. In the taxonomy this idea is referred to as
infrastructural control (black box).
In contrast to regimentation where non-compliance is made impossible by
controlling everything that might lead to a violation of the institutional frame-
work, enforcement “only” uses indirect mechanisms in order to ensure compli-
ance. Thus in enforcement positive or negative incentives are being used that
shall render compliance the preferable choice for an agent.
Putting it simple: regimentation pursues the idea of 100 per cent control (of
either agent actions or their mental states) and consequently compliance can be
always be ensured, however it limits the autonomy of the agents. Furthermore it
seems difficult to implement it in open distributed settings such as UtiC and
might become inoperative in case agents have agreed to conduct the actual
transaction outside the monitored environment (of course messages of such type
could be filtered by the system, this aspect is neglected at this point). Looking
at eBay for example, although the transaction partners agree to live up to their
agreements in a transaction (e.g. deliver a good after the money has been set),
eBay cannot force them to do so, because the physical transaction takes place
outside the eBay marketplace and thus at that point eBay has no direct control
over either the mental states or the actions of the individuals acting on eBay.
Last but not least one further possible problem arises with regimentation, a
problem with its costs. The term costs thereby is not necessarily understood in
monetary terms, but can for example be seen in the increased number of messages
(infrastructural resources) that are needed for the 100 per cent monitoring. This
is where enforcement steps in. Although maybe preferable in some situations,
enforcement aims at as much control as possible control at resonable costs for the
compliance. As already mentioned it instead makes use of negative and positive
incentives that can be applied not only by the organization, but all agents acting
in the system as well and therefore can reduce the costs of UtiC designers, by
reducing their monitoring work.
Now that the heads of the table columns have been discussed, finally the com-
bined systems that result from the intersection of the components of compliance-
ensuring shall be explained in more detail. These are infrastructural control
(white / black box), the institutionalization of other agents, infrastructural
assisted enforcement (third-party / second-party), informal control, promisee-
enforced rules and self control. Thereby special focus will be on the enforcement
10 Tina Balke
related concepts and infrastructural control (i.e. regimentation) will be neglected
as it has just been discussed.
3.2 Institutionalization of Agents
The institutionalization of other agents can be thought of in form of the im-
plementation of agents with special rights (i.e. some kind of police agents) that
patrol the environment (in our example the UtiC environment) and sanction
negative behavior (i.e. non-compliance) if spotted. These police agents are given
their special rights by the UtiC designer (i.e. they are infrastructural entities
and receive their power from the institutional framework provided by the UtiC
infrastructure) and consequently perform an institutional compliance-ensuring.
However in contrast to regimentation the police agents do not control all actions
but only act as enforcers if violations are spotted. The spotting of the institution-
violation is done by the police agents themselves who test the behavior of agents
at random and react to what they detect. Looking at the kind of sanctions that
can be applied by the police agents several sanctions can be thought of (depend-
ing on the severity of the non-compliance) such as a complete exclusion of the
UtiC system to penalty payments or replacement deliveries of the resources (e.g.
disk space).
3.3 Infrastructural Assisted Enforcement (Second-Party /
Third-Party)
The concepts of infrastructural assisted enforcement are very close to the idea
of the institutionalization of other agents. Thus again infrastructural entities
act as compliance ensuring entities that can make use of sanctions ranging from
a complete exclusion of the UtiC system to penalty payments or replacement
deliveries of the resources (e.g. disk space). However in contrast to the concept
of the institutionalization of other agents, not the infrastructural entities act as
observers, but either the agent that was acted upon, i.e. the agents that was
deceived by its transaction partner (second-party observer) or the observation
is done by a third-party, i.e. an agent that is not involved in the transaction
but has spotted the non-compliance of one actor. These observers then call the
infrastructural entities for conducting the sanctioning in order to assure com-
pliance. Thus, in contrast to the institutionalization of other agents where the
infrastructural entities act on their own observations, in these two cases, an ad-
ditional communication effort must be made that bears two problems. First of
all the additional communication needed might result in a longer reaction time
and furthermore, the infrastructural entities need to verify the testimonies made
to them as the agents my lie on purpose in order to have rival agents sanctioned
(and thereby profit themselves).
One sample application of this taxonomy element (with second-party ob-
servers) was described by Balke and Eymann [2, 3] that seized an idea by Gu¨th
and Ockenfels [22] and analyzed the effects of an arbitration board as infras-
tructural entity that can be called by any agent that has been deceived. Using
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an game-theoretic approach, in their paper they showed that with the help of
the arbitration board, it is possible to increase trust and reduce strategic uncer-
tainty in open environments such as UtiC markets where software agents trade
standardized resources on behalf of their human owners, even if the arbitration
board is not equipped with superior detection capabilities, but uses Bayesian
rules for assessing the trustworthiness of the agents.
3.4 Informal Control and Promisee-Enforced Rules
Two other concepts that can be thought of where second- or third party observer
information is being used are informal control and promisee-enforced rules. Al-
though looking different in figure 1 at the first glance (i.e. in promisee-enforced
rules concept it is the agent that has been promised something (i.e. he is a
promisee) but didn’t receive it as promised who observes and sanctions the non-
compliance, whereas in the informal control concept third-party agents observe
and sanction) the two concepts are closely interrelated and are therefore pre-
sented together in this section. This interrelation can be understood best when
thinking about examples for the two concepts. Thus promisee-enforced rules can
be found in image-based trust mechanisms, whereas informal control can be
found in reputation mechanisms.
Image is a global or averaged evaluation of a given target on the part of an
individual. It consists of a set of evaluative beliefs [27] about the characteristics
of a target. These evaluative beliefs concern the ability or possibility for the
target to fulfill one or more of the evaluator’s goals, e.g. to behave responsibly in
an economic transaction. An image, basically, tells whether the target is “good”
or “bad”, or “not so bad” etc. with respect to a norm, a standard, a skill etc.
In contrast reputation is the process and the effect of transmission of a target
image. The evaluation circulating as social reputation may concern a subset of
the target’s characteristics, e.g. its willingness to comply with socially accepted
norms and customs [11].
Putting it simple, an image is the picture an individual has gained about
someone else (the target) based on his own previous observations of that target.
If using reputation, the individual expands the information source about the
target beyond its own scope and includes the information of others about the
target as well [24].
Applying this to the taxonomy example the following picture can be drawn:
in the promisee-enforced rules concept, it is the promisee who acquires an image
of the agent it is interacting with. In case the other agent does not perform as
promised that promisee can sanction the non-compliance by for example not
interacting with the agent once more, etc. In contrast in case of informal con-
trol, third-party agents observe a transaction and form an own image about the
transaction participant. Then the individual images of agents are shared between
the agents and hence they are aggregated by the society (e.g. with the help of
gossip) and agents that did not comply with the institutional framework have to
fear that every agent that receives the information about their non-compliance
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will not act with them in the future, thus in this example the whole society
functions as enforcers.
3.5 Self-Control
The last part of the taxonomy that shall be discussed in this paper is self-control.
In contrast to all other compliance-ensuring mechanisms presented so far, it does
not included any additional party, but only the agent performing an action itself.
This agent is assumed to have an own normative value system that it was given
by its principal and constantly checks whether his actions are in accordance with
that own value system and the institutional framework of the UtiC environment
(i.e. the agent is its own observer). Thereby it has to be noted that the two
normative value systems (i.e. the private one of the agent and the UtiC one)
can contradict and needn’t necessarily be consistent with one another. Based
on the normative value system the agent can then decide to sanction itself. An
example of such a self-control scenario in UtiC could be that an vendor of UtiC
resources that didn’t deliver what he promised (e.g. he promised 1 Tera byte of
hard disk space available, but only could provide 0.99 Tera byte) is discontent
with his performance (although the buyer might not have complained) and as a
result offers his buyer a refund for the money paid.
4 Further Research
After presenting this short taxonomy for compliance-ensuring mechanisms in a
next step the highlighted enforcement mechanisms shall be evaluated one against
the other. Thus, the different enforcement mechanisms will be evaluated against
performance indicators derived from literature. These performance indicators
can be sen in figure 2.
With the help of the taxonomy developed that aims to prototypically repre-
sent existing enforcement mechanisms, an analysis of the technological restric-
tions of UtiC as well as economic theory, finally a sample UtiC market model
without and with the corresponding enforcement mechanisms will be deduced
as a next step. This market model will serve as the initial point for the later
simulations.
The simulation will be conducted in form of a MAS simulation because MAS
offer strong models for representing complex and dynamic environment such as
UtiC markets that cannot be analyzed mathematically any more, but need to be
simulated. For the simulation a social science simulation research process that
is based on works of Gilbert and Troitzsch [18] and Dooley [12] and can be seen
in figure 3 will be used.
Looking at the process, first of all an abstract model has to be conceptualized
and designed that represents the described UtiC market (with and without the
different enforcement mechanisms that are derived from the compliance-ensuring
taxonomy) adequately. This includes the consideration of the specification of
UtiC. For these UtiC specifications, specifications from existing computational
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Grid and systems such as the LHC Grid, TeraGrid and GEON-Grid or Grid5000
[35] will be used, as these are existing technical implementations of the economic
vision of UtiC.
Once the model has been designed, the building issue needs to be consid-
ered, i.e. the model just designed has to be implemented in a MAS simulation
environment. Therefore the SimIS simulation environment that is based on the
Repast Simphony Simulation Toolkit will be used as it allows to model computa-
tional Grid systems in form of “physical” nodes and edges between these nodes,
whereas each nodes hosts different agents, which fulfill a certain role each. After-
wards, the next step in the simulation research process is to check if the current
model is actually doing what it is expected to do. This process of checking is
called verification. In addition to this step the simulation has to be ensured to
reflect the behavior of the target, which is called validation. “Validity can be
ascertained by comparing the output of the simulation with data collected from
the target.” [18]
The idea of the simulation experiment is that in the initial form of the sim-
ulation, the market model will be implemented in the simulation environment
without an enforcement mechanism and will be calibrated in the course of the
simulations. Thus, throughout the simulation the UtiC market setting will be
altered in terms of the enforcement mechanism applied. In the analysis of the
simulation results afterwards, the initial form of the market as well as the market
outcome depending on the enforcement mechanism will serve as a reference for
the efficiency of different enforcement concepts with regard to the UtiC market
setting.
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After the test of the hypotheses and the corresponding calibration of the
simulation, the simulation results will be analyzed and evaluated in order to
arrive at set-up specific simulation results in a first step, as well as generalize-able
results for the UtiC domain in a second step. Resulting from these evaluations in
a last step a generalization is aimed at analyzing which enforcement mechanisms
works best for UtiC in which situation.
5 Conclusion
Using an UtiC example, in this paper a taxonomy for ensuring-compliance in
open distributed systems was presented. The taxonomy that was synthesized
based on considerations of the components and participants of compliance en-
suring mechanism in general (see section 3) consists of 8 idealized concepts that
were discussed with the help of examples in the further course of the paper. The
author views these concepts as a basis for not only analyzing different compli-
ance mechanisms, but also for comparing, combining and in general developing
corresponding strategies. Thus in the future work the author plan to simulate
prototypical implementations of the taxonomy elements (all based on the same
simulation setting) and analyze the performance with regard to compliance en-
suring and especially the corresponding cost-benefit ratio. Furthermore, a de-
tailed analysis of the interplay of the taxonomy elements will be made, as in
theory not only the individual taxonomy elements are realistic for compliance
ensuring strategies, but any combination of the elements is thinkable. However
in order to derive at this point, first of all the very high-level concepts presented
in this paper need to be made “processable”. That means that first off all, in
the next step the concepts will be analyzed with regard to their transferability
to a logical sound and operational Agent-Based Model. This model will then
be used as described in chapter 4. This means that an Agent-Based Model as
“processable” model of the economic theory will be developed that will that
serve as starting point for a MAS simulation. This simulation aims at evaluat-
ing the enforcement concepts that were presented in this paper with regard to
the performance indicators mentioned before. With the help of the results the
authors hope to be able to draw more general conclusions and arrive at propo-
sitions which enforcement concept seem appropriate if only certain performance
indicators need to be fulfilled.
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